blue marble
Comparing Inferential Strategies of Humans and Large Language Models in Deductive Reasoning
Mondorf, Philipp, Plank, Barbara
Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like $\textit{supposition following}$ or $\textit{chain construction}$. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.
Beyond Bayes-optimality: meta-learning what you know you don't know
Grau-Moya, Jordi, Delรฉtang, Grรฉgoire, Kunesch, Markus, Genewein, Tim, Catt, Elliot, Li, Kevin, Ruoss, Anian, Cundy, Chris, Veness, Joel, Wang, Jane, Hutter, Marcus, Summerfield, Christopher, Legg, Shane, Ortega, Pedro
Meta-training agents with memory has been shown to culminate in Bayes-optimal agents, which casts Bayes-optimality as the implicit solution to a numerical optimization problem rather than an explicit modeling assumption. Bayes-optimal agents are risk-neutral, since they solely attune to the expected return, and ambiguity-neutral, since they act in new situations as if the uncertainty were known. This is in contrast to risk-sensitive agents, which additionally exploit the higher-order moments of the return, and ambiguity-sensitive agents, which act differently when recognizing situations in which they lack knowledge. Humans are also known to be averse to ambiguity and sensitive to risk in ways that aren't Bayes-optimal, indicating that such sensitivity can confer advantages, especially in safety-critical situations. How can we extend the meta-learning protocol to generate risk- and ambiguity-sensitive agents? The goal of this work is to fill this gap in the literature by showing that risk- and ambiguity-sensitivity also emerge as the result of an optimization problem using modified meta-training algorithms, which manipulate the experience-generation process of the learner. We empirically test our proposed meta-training algorithms on agents exposed to foundational classes of decision-making experiments and demonstrate that they become sensitive to risk and ambiguity.
Towards Swarm Calculus: Urn Models of Collective Decisions and Universal Properties of Swarm Performance
Methods of general applicability are searched for in swarm intelligence with the aim of gaining new insights about natural swarms and to develop design methodologies for artificial swarms. An ideal solution could be a `swarm calculus' that allows to calculate key features of swarms such as expected swarm performance and robustness based on only a few parameters. To work towards this ideal, one needs to find methods and models with high degrees of generality. In this paper, we report two models that might be examples of exceptional generality. First, an abstract model is presented that describes swarm performance depending on swarm density based on the dichotomy between cooperation and interference. Typical swarm experiments are given as examples to show how the model fits to several different results. Second, we give an abstract model of collective decision making that is inspired by urn models. The effects of positive feedback probability, that is increasing over time in a decision making system, are understood by the help of a parameter that controls the feedback based on the swarm's current consensus. Several applicable methods, such as the description as Markov process, calculation of splitting probabilities, mean first passage times, and measurements of positive feedback, are discussed and applications to artificial and natural swarms are reported.